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“Former PM sent personal note to Indira Gandhi saying Britain supported 
India's unity in face of demands for Sikh homeland... Margaret Thatcher gave 
her Indian counterpart Indira Gandhi Britain's full support in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1984 Golden Temple raid.” 
(The Guardian, 15 January 2014) 
 
“The UK government has been accused of creating "appalling delays" to 
 the outlawing of caste discrimination.” 




This chapter explores the British Sikh community’s responses to two recent events, both 
related to British Parliament: 1) the alleged involvement of the British SAS (Special Air 
Service) in the planning of Operation Blue Star1 and 2) the lobbying of British Parliament to 
legislate against caste discrimination under the Equality Act. Both demanded an educated and 
mature response from British Sikhs in the light of issues surrounding equality and human 
rights. This study is based on my ethnographic research that I have been conducting since 
2010. Here, I analyse my interviews with organisers of both social and political activism in 
order to explore the effect that media and globalisation have had on the younger generation of 
British Sikhs.   
This chapter examines whether the British Sikh community have taken on a fresh 
approach when confronted with issues surrounding equality and human rights and explores 
how youth-led Sikh groups and organisations such as Sikh Federation UK, The Sikh Council 
UK, the Sikh Network and Kesri Lehar have responded to contemporary challenges (and 
indeed opportunities) by using Sikhi in a sophisticated manner to address such issues 
politically and socially. I place the collective efforts of such British Sikh organisations, and 
indeed, of young Sikh individuals, within the wider international context in order to explore 
whether there are generational trends in the socio-political activism of millennial Sikhs with 
that of the older generation of Sikhs.  
The proposed changes to British legislation in order to make caste discrimination 
illegal in the United Kingdom has caused much unrest amongst the Hindu, Sikh and Dalit 
communities in Britain. The pro-legislation organisations are primarily from the Dalit 
community in Britain and represent Ravidassias, Valmikis, Christians and Buddhists. 
CasteWatchUK and the Anti Caste Discrimination Alliance (ACDA) have been spearheading 
the campaign, along with other Organisations which include VODI (Voice of Dalit 
International), FABO (Federation of Ambedkarite and Buddhist Organisations, and Dalit 
Solidarity Network.  The main opponents of the legislation, the anti-legislation organizations, 
include Sikh Council UK and the Alliance of Hindu Organisations UK. To some degree, 
there was unanimity amongst most British Sikh organisations that legislation against caste 
discrimination was unnecessary under British law. Many Sikh organisations joined forces 
with the Alliance of Hindu Organisations to declare that ‘caste allegiances were on their way 
out in the UK’ and demanded a Sunset Clause. However, the handling of the alleged co-
operation between Indira Gandhi and Margaret Thatcher brought issues of leadership and 
collegiality amongst British Sikhs into question. What became apparent is that there is no one 
overall authoritative British Sikh organisation or body which represents the community as a 
whole. Limited understanding by Sikhs of the process for the inquiry requested by the British 
Prime Minister, David Cameron, may also have added to the chaotic assembling of Sikh 
Organisations at Parliament. This chapter examines the political engagement of the younger 
generation of British Sikhs with Britain’s policies relating to equality and human rights. 
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Legislation against caste discrimination in the UK Single Equality Bill 
The role played by, and attitudes toward, caste amongst Sikhs is a contentious issue, one 
which almost always raises a heated debate. The Sikh Gurus’ teachings on caste are clear; 
those who are followers of the Gurus should not practice caste discrimination (Takhar 2005; 
Kalsi 1989). The key Sikh teaching about the imminence of the Divine within each and every 
human being leaves no scope for discrimination either on the basis of caste or on the basis of 
gender. The Guru Granth Sahib is very clear on this point, as a hymn of Guru Nanak states: 
 Recognise the Divine Light within all, there is no caste in the afterlife. 
                                                              (Guru Granth Sahib, Ang/Page 349)  
Guru Nanak’s message was also repeated by his successors. Guru Amar Das writes:  
“When you die you do not carry your caste with you. It is your deeds [and not 
your caste] which will determine your fate” (Guru Granth Sahib, Ang/Page 363) 
 
However, there is a lack of evidence to suggest that the Gurus’ social comments on caste 
were intended to completely eradicate a system which identified individuals with an in-group. 
The Sikh tradition also maintains that the Gurus, as well as their offspring, all married  in 
accordance with rules around endogamy within the Khatri zat (jati). Nevertheless, Surinder 
Singh Jodhka has argued that although caste plays a role amongst the Sikhs, it takes on a 
marked difference in actual practice from its traditional forms amongst non-Sikh 
communities, writing: “... Sikh caste differs from its more classical antecedents... [and there 
is no] specific caste group comparable to the kind of division that the textbook view of caste 
suggests” (Jodhka 2014: 583).  The lobbying of Parliament, mostly by Dalit groups, from 
2003 onwards, and especially from 2010–2013, to pass legislation in making caste-based 
discrimination a punishable offence, resulted in British Sikhs re-evaluating their attitudes 
towards equality based on caste. A historic debate took place on the Sikh Channel in April 
2013 presenting cases both in opposition as well as in support of the anti-caste discrimination 
legislation. The Sikh Council UK, Hindu Council UK (now absorbed within a larger group 
currently known as the Alliance of Hindu Organizations) and Dalit organisations such as 
CasteWatch UK and Anti Caste Discrimination Alliance had all drafted press releases ahead 
of the debate to clearly highlight their particular organisation’s stance toward the legislation. 
The Sikh Channel debate took place a few days before the legislation was passed on 23 April, 
2013 when British Parliament agreed to an amendment on caste to the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Bill. However, the implementation of this legislation has yet to move 
forward, mostly because of opposition from Sikh and Hindu communities in Britain who 
argue that there is simply not enough evidence to suggest that caste-based discrimination is 
an issue amongst South Asians living in Britain. Their concern is also that the 
implementation of the legislation would institutionalise caste distinctions amongst South 
Asian Britons and, more so, their belief is that caste discrimination does not take place in 
Britain. The response from Dalit individuals and pro-legislation organisations is that non-
Dalit South Asians living in Britain are purposefully turning a blind eye to caste-based 
discrimination. The concern from Dalit organisations is that they left India to escape the overt 
discrimination they faced as Dalits on a daily basis. For many Dalits, the words of 
Omprakash Valmiki (in his 2003 autobiography Joothan) are reminiscent of the sentiment 
and emotion behind Dalit activism in support of the legislation over the harsh treatment that 
they had endeavoured to leave behind in India:  
“Dalit life is excruciatingly painful, charred by experiences… We have grown up in a 
social order that is extremely cruel and inhuman. And compassionless towards 
Dalits.” (Valmiki 2003: xiii).  
 
A number of Dalits supporting the legislation also identify themselves as Ravidassi Sikhs and 
Valmiki Sikhs. The Ravidassias, also referred to as Ravidassi, acknowledge allegiance to 
Ravidass as their Guru (see Takhar 2005: chapter 4). There are forty-one hymns of Ravidass, 
referred to as Bhagat (devotee) by Sikhs at large, in the Guru Granth Sahib.  His community 
of followers, like himself, are exclusively from the chamar caste (zat) of Dalits.  The 
Valmikis are from the chuhra zat of Dalits and claim that this was also the caste of Valmiki, 
the author of the Hindu epic, the Ramayana (see Takhar 2005: chapter 5).  These identities 
are far from being rigid however, as the results of the 2011 UK Census highlighted (Takhar 
2011; 2014).  
My research has attempted to make sense of the paradox of attitudes from both pro-
caste legislation organisations and individuals as well as anti-caste legislation organisations 
and individuals. If the teachings of the Gurus are taken as a yardstick, then surely Sikh 
organisations should be welcoming of the legislation around caste-based discrimination? 
However, the main concerns of the Sikh Council UK are over terminology and definitions 
used in the various reports highlighting the extent of caste-based discrimination in the UK. 
The Sikh Council maintains that the prolonged implementation of the legislation is welcome 
in order to give time for it to be thought out since they believe there are many pitfalls in the 
current definitions of caste within the legislation. The Sikh Council UK  adamantly assert that 
the methodology employed to produce the NIESR report, was flawed as it only interviewed 
victims of caste-based discrimination from Dalit backgrounds. The National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research (NIESR) appointed Hilary Metcalfe and Heather Rolfe to 
produce a report on Caste Discrimination and Harassment in Great Britain (2010). 2 The 
NIESR Report found that there is significant evidence of caste based discrimination in Britain 
in the areas of  employment, education and in the provision of care services.  The Report’s 
recommendation was that legislation is necessary in order to punish perpetrators of caste 
discrimination in the three areas highlighted above.  The Report suggested that a revision to 
the definition of ‘race’ in the Equality Act 2010 would accommodate the amendment to 
include caste.  SubsequnetlySubsequently, the Sikh Council’s Press Release in May 2013 
stated:  
In line with the teaching of Guru Nanak Dev Ji, the Sikh Council UK fully supported 
the sentiments of creating a casteless and equal society but raised serious concerns 
about the impact of ill-considered legislation based upon flawed research. Following 
extensive lobbying of Minister, Lords and MPs the Sikh Council UK has been 
credited with taking a measured, thoughtful and pragmatic approach in helping 
resolve a complex issue.  
 
Based on my interviews with a number of leaders from organisations in support of the 
legislation,  the view is that the obstacles in the implementation of the legislation are a 
question of Sikhs in particular having to openly deal with the hypocritical distance between 
Sikh teachings and actual practice. Opponents of the legislation (mainly the British Sikh and 
Hindu communities) believe that education, rather than legislation, is the best way to tackle 
caste based prejudice and discrimination, if it does indeed exist at all. However, a number of 
educational programmes instigated by the Sikh and Hindu communities have failed to 
achieve their goals. A recent report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission has also 
failed to convince the opponents to rethink their stance since the Hindu and Sikh 
communities have found these unsatisfactory as, in their opinion, they simply echo the 
NIESR report. Opponents of the caste legislation thus argue that the legislation is 
unnecessary in view of their firmly held conviction that caste-based identification, and 
indeed, any associated prejudice, are “on their way out” amongst the younger generation of 
British South Asians. Although the British Hindu community united under one umbrella 
organisation with the formation of the Alliance of Hindu Organisations (AHO), the Sikh 
Community had a number of ‘spokespersons’ representing the Sikh view of opposition to the 
legislation. The main voice, though not the only voice in opposition to the legislation, was 
that of the Sikh Council. Importantly, their opposition is not an objection to the principle of 
equality and human rights of all per se, but an insistence that the term ‘descent’  is more 
appropriate as a protected category  using the term ‘caste’ to amend the Equality Act 2010.  
Their view is largely based on the assumption that Sikhi rejects the caste system and 
therefore any prejudice and discrimination associated with the caste system does not apply to 
the Sikhs.  The Sikh Council UK further cite that the United Nations’ definition of racism 
covers ‘descent’ and this therefore, is a far relevant term to be used in order to protect against 
any unintended consequences of the legislation for the Sikh community. 
Among the various South Asian communities in the UK, there are long-established 
traditions, conceptions, and associations based on caste. Although Guru Gobind Singh’s 
initiation of the Khalsa institutionalised the use of Singh and Kaur as surnames in 1699 CE, 
many Sikhs continue to use their family names as a means of identification. This does not, 
and should not, be equated with such Sikhs having a ‘caste-ist’ mentality that carries the 
stigma of either pollution or purity. A number of young British Sikhs whom I have 
interviewed have adamantly asserted that there is nothing wrong with identifying as Jat, 
Ramgharia, Bhatra, Ravidassi, and so forth. Their viewpoints are particularly relevant when 
bearing in mind that much of the work carried out on caste, especially in the Indian context, 
tends to demonise it without exploring its psychological relevance amongst young British 
Sikhs. Having said this however, I also appreciate that much work on caste has been 
undertaken from an empirical and ethnographic approach which highlights the harsh 
discrimination faced by victims from the Dalit community in particular (Nesbitt 1994; 
Gorringe and Rafanell 2007). 
In order to make sense of the role, if any, played by caste amongst Sikhs, I took part 
in a social psychological study by interviewing young British Sikhs in order to gather 
qualitative data on a number of themes relating to how they identified themselves (Jaspal and 
Takhar 2016). We used the Identity Process Theory, which explores the protection of identity 
at an individual level (see Breakwell 1986) to analyse the responses we gathered.  The 
findings of our research further confirm the complexity of how caste operates at a practical 
level amongst the Sikhs, specifically British Sikhs in the context of the research we 
undertook. Contrary to popular understandings of caste, identification with a caste is not 
synonymous with caste-based prejudice and discrimination (Jaspal and Takhar 2016).  
The Sikh Council has insisted on a ‘Sunset Clause’, which states that the legislation 
should be valid for a period of ten to fifteen years at maximum, since, ostensibly, caste will 
have no relevance at all amongst South Asians beyond that time frame. To some degree they 
are correct, mixed caste marriages are becoming more acceptable in the British Sikh 
community, although the preference amongst the older generation is for endogamy. From the 
personal interviews I have carried out over the past decade, young British Sikhs adamantly 
assert that they have never seen, experienced or carried out caste-based discrimination in their 
adherence to the principles of Sikhi. Many of these young Sikhs have however offered to 
meet victims of caste-based discrimination to hear about their experiences first-hand. So for 
many British Sikh millennials, open dialogue is the way forward, rather than dismissing 
casteist attitudes within their community as being non-existent. The millennial generation are 
also more likely to marry out of caste as a practical step towards achieving a caste-less Panth. 
The older generation of British Sikhs however, are not so receptive to overturn the system of 
endogamy.  Dalit individuals whom I have interviewed, however, have often responded by 
remarking that young British Sikhs turn a blind eye to such issues. 
The complexities around legislating against caste-based discrimination in Britain have 
been discussed at length by Prakash Shah (2015). His argument largely focuses on the 
problematic issues relating to the legal framework within which the legislation is positioned. 
Interestingly, his discussion gives credence to the anti-caste-legislation attitudes and draws on 
extended ethnographic research on Hindu and Sikh perspectives. His work echoes a number 
of the concerns put forward by the Sikh Council UK in emphasizing that caste discrimination 
is not an issue in the UK (for a detailed insight into the Sikh Council UK’s views, see Jaspal 
and Takhar 2016). Another report, which in many ways supports the Sikh Council’s 
conviction that caste plays no role amongst British Sikhs, is the British Sikh Report (BSR) 
20133 which has been produced annually since 2013 to provide an overview of the needs and 
challenges faced by the British Sikh community. The report covers a number of areas, 
including education, wealth, occupation and caste  According to the BSR 2013, 61.2% of the 
662 respondents indicated that caste-related issues are of no concern to them.  , Indeed, it is 
the millennial British Sikh generation whom have been most vocal in their opposition to the 
caste legislation in Britain as being unnecessary.  Case Studies from pro-legislation 
organisations however, paint a very different picture and highlight that Dalits living in the 
UK have been victims of caste-based discrimination as a result of prejudice on the part of 
Sikhs.  
 
Indira Gandhi and Margaret Thatcher’s collaboration over Operation Blue Star 
I shall now go on to discuss the British Sikh community’s response to another recent 
event, again relating to British Parliament: the alleged involvement of the British SAS 
(Special Air Service) in the planning of Operation Blue Star, the 1984 attack on the Sikhs’ 
most revered holy shrine in Amritsar, Punjab that resulted in the massacre of thousands of 
innocent worshippers4. The revelations in January 2014 of the SAS’s alleged involvement in 
the planning of the attacks on the Harmandir Sahib in June 1984 rapidly mobilised young 
British Sikhs to demand justice for the abuse of the human rights of thousands of Sikh 
victims during Operation Blue Star and the subsequent genocide of thousands of Sikhs in 
Delhi in November 1984 (for a detailed account of the events in Delhi, November 1984, see 
Mitta and Phoolka, 2007; Singh Pav, 2017). Shinder Thandi (2012) has observed that Sikhs 
in Britain have the networks to be able to mobilize themselves quickly over issues concerning 
events in Punjab and elsewhere that concern Sikhs. Sikh utilisation of multimedia has been an 
important tool via which to do this. Almost immediately the Sikh-themed TV Channels were 
covering various stories and interviewing individuals about their responses to the revelations. 
On the surface, there appeared to be unity amongst the British Panthic organisations and 
Jathebandhis (political organisations) in terms of demanding an inquiry into the full extent of 
collaboration between the Indian Government and British Government in the planning of 
Operation Blue Star. 
 However, a limited understanding of the process for the inquiry and a lack of clear 
terms of reference resulted in issues around authority amongst the leaders of the various 
British Sikh Organisations. The situation was unfortunately one which displayed a lack of 
leadership within the British Panth as a whole. What resulted on the part of the Conservative 
Government was a rushed internal review carried out by Sir Jeremy Heywood, the Cabinet 
Secretary. A number of pertinent files relating to the SAS’s visit to India at the time of 
Operation Blue Star also mysteriously went missing, whilst others were withheld. The 
internal inquiry concluded that SAS involvement was minimal and there was no indication 
that the Indian Government took their advice. The shambolic approach to the inquiry by 
Heywood left the majority of concerned Sikhs totally dismayed. How, as British citizens, 
could their own government advise an attack on their holiest of shrines? Many young British 
Sikhs’ posts on social media questioned whether a British Sikh identity under such 
revelations has any meaning at all and how David Cameron and his cabinet advisors got away 
with such a problematic inquiry.   
 My personal correspondence with key British Sikh individuals at the time shed some 
light on the situation. The issue in this case, unlike that of caste legislation, was the overall 
anarchic approach of every single British Sikh organisation claiming to be the voice of the 
British Panth. In actual fact, there was no one voice that could successfully relay the 
emotions and sentiments of the British Panth back to David Cameron. The lack of an 
authoritative voice which speaks for Sikhs in the various countries of their diaspora, is not 
unique to the British situation. Issues around Panthic authority in terms of both discursive and 
political representations, exist because there is simply no “obvious apex authority or 
ecclesiastical hieracrchy to represent Sikh collective interests to outside parties (Dusenbery 
2008: 318), this has resulted in often competing claims to authority amongst the various 
organisations and Jathebandis within the Panth. Nevertheless, based on my ethnographic 
work amongst the British Panth, I have observed that the tone has changed, albeit slightly, 
since January 2014. There is more of an understanding of political processes with more 
young British Sikh professionals wanting to get involved, drawing on international human 
rights discourse to demand justice and to pressure the United Nations to recognise the 
massacre, torture, and rape of Sikhs in 1984 as genocide. Young British Sikhs want to see 
change in the way they and their community are portrayed in social media to the rest of the 
world. The Sikh Network (formed in November 2014) is reflective of young British Sikhs, 
many from well educated and professional backgrounds, getting involved with issues that 
matter to the wider Sikh Panth. Jas Singh, who leads the Sikh Network, and is also Advisor to 
the Sikh Federation UK, organises the annual Freedom Rally in June through Central London 
to protest against the lack of justice for victims of the 1984 Sikh Genocide.  Jas is an example 
of a professional young British Sikh millenial who feels it very much his duty to take 
practical steps in terms of the issues that matter to him. During an interview he commented : 
 
“... [the] cornerstone of Sikhi is about being an activist, started by Guru Nanak Dev Ji, 
so I believe you are not being true to Sikhi unless you awaken the activist within. 
Becoming tired of being one of the typical Sikh observers criticising from the side-
lines, I decided to actually do something!”  Interviewed in person by the author at 
Guru Arjan Dev Gurdwara, Derby, UK, 2nd February 2015. 
 
In my fieldwork, I have observed an increase in young professional British Sikhs being 
involved in political activism. This has not gone unnoticed by the British and Indian 
Governments, as details have emerged of an alleged meeting in London between the Indian 
and UK Governments on 15 January 2015 to discuss the rise of radicalisation amongst British 
Sikhs5.  
A number of key questions are pertinent: Is Sikh political activism being termed as 
radicalisation? Can we identify a generational trend amongst Sikh political activists? What 
has caused this apparent increase in younger Sikhs becoming involved with political 
activism? Interestingly, in April 2013 the National Union of Students (NUS) showed its 
support for demanding justice for the victims of the Sikh Genocide of 1984. This could 
suggest that University Sikh Societies are strengthening political activism amongst Sikh 
University students. There has been an increase in seminars on the 1984 Sikh Genocide 
across Sikh Student societies for the past couple of years. Very often these seminars are also 
followed up with talks around the issue of Sikh separatism in the form of Khalistan. The 
extent to which the demand for justice often becomes associated with the demand for 
Khalistan is clearly highlighted by Darshan Singh Tatla:  
  
Certainly, the 1984 tragedy has become a ‘critical event’ forcing many Sikhs to 
examine the community’s standing in the global world of nation states and to 
formulate their relationship with the Punjab and post-colonial Indian polity. A major 
debate has emerged around the need for a sovereign state with various responses. 
(Tatla 2014: 509).  
 
However, it is equally true that support or rejection of a Sikh separatist state also divides 
many young British Sikhs. Not all British Sikh activists necessarily regard their activism as 
being related to Sikh ethno-nationalism (for a detailed discussion about ethno-nationalism in 
the Sikh context, see Gurharpal Singh, 2001). Although the majority of activists I have 
spoken to at rallies, demonstrations, and protests wholeheartedly support a UN led inquiry 
into the 1984 Sikh Genocide, it is the Khalistan issue that divides them. Importantly, I have 
seen an increase in young professional British Sikhs adamantly expressing their views that 
Khalistan is the only solution to preserving Sikh Heritage. These young Sikhs have carried 
out their own research and formulated their own views on the topics which affect their 
relationships with their ancestral homeland of Punjab and thus strengthens Darshan Singh 
Tatla’s claim that: 
 
Undoubtedly, a defining characteristic of overseas Sikhs (which has contributed to 
their status as diaspora) is its abiding concern and involvement with the land of its 
origin... Overseas Sikhs have maintained a close relationship with their former 
villages, the region and with the Punjab as a whole in many different forms: through 
social, economic and philanthropic linkages. Overseas Sikhs have kept abreast of 
events in Punjab through the Punjabi media, visits and other channels of 
communication (Tatla 2012: 3-4). 
 
These same professional Sikhs are asking for informed debates around Sikh separatism and 
Khalistan as an actual state, not one that is only utopian or imagined. Other Sikh 
professionals actively involved in lobbying the UN to recognise the massacres of Sikhs in 
1984 as genocide firmly assert that shouted slogans of “Khalistan Zindabad” puts them off 
from attending political events. A number of scholars in the past have stated that the 
Khalistan movement reached its peak in the 1990s and is today barely existant (Mahmood 
2014; Tatla 2012; Singh, Gurharpal 2001).  According to Chima (2002), Sikh separatism 
“will not re-emerge in Punjab in the near future” (p. 19).  However, I have found the 
Khalistan movement to have a renewed vigour amongst British Sikhs, old and young, male 
and female. Shani has noted that:  
 
Both ‘homeland’ and ‘diaspora’ may be regarded as indivisible parts of a global Sikh 
qaum which sees the establishment of an independent sovereign state as merely one 
strategy used to secure recognition of its cultural and religious particularity (Shani 
2008: 8). 
 
This echoes the views held not only by British Sikhs, but by Sikhs in the broader diaspora, as 
to why a separate state is the only solution to the survival of Sikhi and Sikhs in the 
‘homeland’. The ten failed commissions and committees led by the Indian Government (see 
Mitta and Phoolka 2007) to carry out inquiries into the murder, rape, and torture of Sikhs in 
Delhi in November 1984 provide further push factors for young British Sikhs (along with 
Canadian and American Sikhs) both in the lobbying of the UN, as well as the Khalistan 
movement. These young Sikhs look to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as their inspiration—the 
image of Bhindranwale has indeed become a symbol for the lack of justice to the victims of 
the 1984 Sikh genocide (for further discussion on this topic see Singh and Purewal 2013). 
Although it is a commonly held belief amongst many Sikhs that Bhindranwale himself did 
not demand support for Khalistan, he is nevertheless remembered as having made the 
statement that if the Harmandir Sahib were ever to be attacked by the Indian Government, the 
foundations for Khalistan would be laid (Mahmood 2014: 578). British Sikh political 
activism has much in common with activism by Sikhs, for Sikhs, taking place on a global 
level.  Examples of similar goals relate to the petitioning of the UN to declare the massacre, 
torture and rape of Sikhs in Delhi in 1984 as a Genocide.  In contemporary times, much 
political activism is related to the policies of particular states, particularly against its minority 
communities (Keck and Sikkink 1998). One of my interviewees, Jas Singh from the Sikh 
Network and the Sikh Federation UK adamantly disagrees with the notion that the Khalistan 
movement is today barely acknowledged amongst Sikhs: 
 
I disagree, the movement has just changed, the issues and social injustices still occur 
every day, and never addressed, so how can the solution be forgotten? The cause was 
demonised and silenced by the Indian Government propaganda, and now as the truth 
is becoming clear, we now need to establish the social and civic demands and legal 
right for the Sikh nation to be free, whether that remains within or without India, that 
is up to the government on how they respond and ultimately the people of Punjab. 
Many hold the desire to be free within their hearts both abroad and in India. However, 
until they are free to express their view without the constant fear of arrest, torture or 
death, the struggle will continue to boil within. Interviewed in person by the author at 
Guru Arjan Dev Gurdwara, Derby, UK, 2nd February 2015. 
  
 To be politically engaged and politically active is one of the key tenets of the Sikh faith 
through its Miri-Piri principle, which translates into active participation in worldly affairs 
alongside one’s spiritual journey.  This is clearly represented in the Harmandir Sahib 
complex in Amritsar which also houses the Akal Takhat - the Headquarters of the SGPC 
(Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee). The complex represents ‘temporal power in 
balance with the spiritual’ (Kalra 2014: 262).  
The overall majority of young British Sikh political activists I have spoken to are keen 
to mention that it is being Sikh which is an important contributing factor to their activities 
and support for campaigns for Justice. For them, Operation Blue Star was an attack on their 
faith. This sentiment is further detailed in Joyce Pettigrew’s work (1995), which also 
provides the introductory remarks for the ‘Candle in the Dark’ exhibition produced by the 
National Sikh Youth Federation UK:  
“The army went into [the] Darbar Sahib not to eliminate a political figure or a 
political movement but to suppress culture of a people, to attack their heart, to strike a 
blow at their spirit and self-confidence” (p. 8) 
 
Hence, unsurprisingly, the revelations of British Government involvement in Operation Blue 
Star came as a huge shock in terms of what it meant to be both British and Sikh around the 
time of the revelations in January 2014. The sense of betrayal from the British government 
occupied Sikh media, especially in light of Sikh contributions to the British Army during 
both World Wars. It is important to understand how identity is formed and negotiated 
depending on how a state protects the interests of individuals and communities, especially its 
minority communities. Sikhs constitute less than 2% of the Indian population. After 1984, 
many Sikhs living in Britain ceased to identify as ‘Indian’ and therefore their ‘Britishness’ 
became a strong indicator of their identity. Interestingly, according to the British Sikh Report 
2013, 95% of British Sikhs reported that they were proud of their British-ness.  After March 
2015, however, this dialogue on British Sikh identity has almost become non-existent. 
Reaction to the allegations demanded an educated and mature response from British Sikhs in 
the light of issues surrounding equality and human rights.  
In June 2014, the 1984 Freedom Rally in Central London (organised annually by the 
Federation of Sikh Organisations or FSO) gathered an estimated attendance of 80,000 
(mostly Sikhs) under the theme of ‘Truth, Justice, Freedom’. Sikh Student Societies in British 
Universities under the guidance of the British Organisation of Sikh Students (BOSS) () were 
actively engaged to mobilise Sikh students. The role of social media and the Sikh Channels in 
the mobilisation of British Sikhs has been immense. A number of issues affecting British 
Sikhs in more recent times—from the revelations of the SAS involvement in the planning of 
Operation Blue Star to the hunger strikes by Bhai Gurbaksh Singh—have united Sikh 
millennial activists across the globe in their engagement with wide stream media and social 
networks.  The recently formed Sikh Network in the UK has also been responsible for 
producing the “Sikh Manifesto 2015-2020”,6 a document which highlights ten key areas of 
concern to the British Sikh Community. The objective of the document was  to provide the 
British Sikh Panth with a coherent outline of Sikhs’ expectations from the next Government, 
ahead of the 7 May 2015 General Elections in the United Kingdom. The “Sikh Manifesto” 
was officially launched in British Parliament on 26 February 2015. The Sikh Network claims 
to be a platform for uniting Sikh political activists in the UK. One of the key sections of the 
Sikh Manifesto is for the British Government to commission an independent public inquiry 
into the UK Government’s actions in the lead up to and after the 1984 Sikh Genocide. The 
producing of the “Sikh Manifesto” is a new way of giving political activism in the United 
Kingdom a shared focus. Not all British Sikhs are expected to agree with all of its ten key 
areas, but they are encouraged to actively share their thoughts with Parliamentary Candidates 
regarding the points that resonate with them. 
It has been refreshing to see an increase in Sikh females, particularly from the 
younger generation, visibly taking an active role in protest, awareness events, and rallies in a 
traditionally male-dominated Sikh arena. Aelst and Walgrave (2001) have indeed noted a 
marked increase in activism by females (regardless of faith, belief and non-belief) across the 
globe. The Sikh Organisation for Prisoner Welfare (SOPW) is a prime example of females 
taking the lead in stage presentations and organising fund raising events. SOPW, a British 
organisation, has now been rebranded as Sikh Relief. Sikh Relief is an excellent example of 
the practical ways in which the egalitarian teachings of Sikhi, particularly in relation to 
gender equality, are being visibly practised as more young professional Sikh females view the 
Sikh political environment as a social space in which they have a role to play. The current 
scene in the UK echoes Doris Jakobsh’s words: 
 
In essence, gender constructs are evolutionary, they emerge and develop with the 
shifting needs of the community within which they unfold. They are also susceptible 
to the forces surrounding them, be these political, economic, social or cultural 
(Jakobsh 2003: 238).    
 
 
Millenial Sikh female activists are proudly asserting their equal responsibility to live by the 
Miri-Piri concept. In many respects, South Asian women generally have been “politically 
active, even under the most oppressive circumstances,” as noted by Shaminder Takhar (2007: 
123). She goes on to ponder “...we… need to ask... whether South Asian women face major 
obstacles to political activism because of the intersection of gender, racism, and culture?” 
(2007: 124). From my observations, with the increase in Sikh groups and networks run by the 
younger generation of British Sikh political activists, Sikh women are increasingly finding 
acceptance, and also leadership roles, within political circles. This is a result of socio-cultural 
changes in attitudes towards gendered roles amongst millenials of the Sikh diaspora, 
particularly in Britain, Canada and the USA through the many activist groups prevalent in 
contemporary society. These organisations are actively encouraging women to take an equal 
stand in lobbying for Sikh causes in both the religious as well as political spheres. The 
traditional Jathebandi organisations, however, have some way to go in at least attempting to 
address the overt gender imbalance amongst their members. 
 The findings of the British Sikh Report (BSR) 2015 7  raised some interesting 
responses from informants in relation to the revelations of January 2014. The gendered 
perspective towards the SAS involvement in the planning of Operation Blue Star, according 
to the BSR 2015, indicate that 20% of males were uncertain about the impact that the 
revelations had made upon them personally. In comparison, 37% of female respondents were 
unsure as to how they felt about the revelations as British Sikhs. Nevertheless 24% of females 
indicated that the revelations would play a significant role in their decision as to which Party 
they will vote for, as compared to 36% of males who indicated the same response to the 
question. The BSR 2015 analysis of the statistics obtained from respondents illustrates that: 
 
For some Sikhs, what happened in 1984 remains a highly emotive topic which 
continues to be relevant today. However, it should be noted that not all British Sikhs 
share the same strong emotions about the events of over 30 years ago, as can be noted 
from these findings. 
 
 
Clearly, there is a need for further research into the current British Sikh political activist 
environment in order to be able to gather and analyse why young millenial British Sikhs 
become involved in political activism. It will be interesting to analyse the degree to which 
such activism relates to events of the “homeland”, since according to Nijhawan (2016), Sikhs 
in the diaspora create “social imaginaries” which gives them a sense of belonging to both the 
“homeland” (through images associated with the Sikh Genocide 1984), as well as their 
countries of settlement (p. 44). I quote below three further responses from British Sikhs, as 
stated in the BSR 2015, in relation to the impact of the revelations upon their voting decision 
in the May 2015 General Elections. 
 
Those were tragic days, there was a sense of helplessness in the UK felt by Sikhs. To 
know that the UK government at the time had an input into it (even very small) is 
rather sickening. We are still waiting for justice for the Delhi riots where thousands 
were killed. 
 
It’s important that the Sikh community get the correct answers and reflections into 
what truly happened in 1984. Without the support and backing of a political party this 
may be difficult to achieve. 
 
I would like full disclosure of the facts therefore allowing the whole truth to be 
revealed in an honest and transparent way. The government needs to be 
compassionate, righteous, brave and firm to show the complete honest truth. 
 
The testimonies above clearly voice a sense of betrayal by the then British Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, and her Government and clearly illustrate that millenial Sikhs, as well as 
Sikh activist organisations, have been demanding a full enquiry into the extent of the British 
Government’s role in the planning of Operation Bluestar.   Another recently produced report, 
the UK Sikh Survey 2016, further evidences such activism in its findings that 92% of British 
Sikhs believe there should be an independent public enquiry “to establish the full facts about 
UK Government involvement” in Operation Bluestar (p. 14).8 The UK Sikh Survey 2016 is 
built around the ethos of the Sikh Manifesto, also produced by the Sikh Network. 
The Sikh Network’s Sikh Manifesto: 2015-2020 which was based on nationwide 
consultations amongst British Sikhs, lists both an Independent public inquiry into the UK 
government’s involvement in planning Operation Blue Star and also asks for a United 
Nations-led inquiry into the 1984 Sikh genocide. Therefore, such issues are of concern to a 
significant number of British Sikhs. Their disengagement with such issues needs to be 
explored in terms of whether family, the gurdwara, and their broader surroundings have roles 
to play in a young British Sikh’s decision to become involved with political activism relating 
to events in Punjab, Delhi, and elsewhere in India. Do university Sikh societies have a role to 
play? The National Union of Students, a national body representing University students in 
Britain, is also supporting and endorsing the ‘1984 Yes, it’s Genocide’9  campaign, which is 
asking the United Nations to investigate the truth into the extent of the massacre, torture, 
murder  and rape of the Delhi Sikhs in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination by her 
two Sikh bodyguards on 31 October 1984 
There has been a great deal of scholarship on political activism within the Muslim 
community in Britain (see, for example: Nagel & Staeheli, 2011; Bolognani & Statham, 
2013; Allen, 2010). In comparison, there is little data or statistics available relating to young 
British Sikhs. For example, can an age range be identified from those who attend rallies, 
protests and so forth? Such data would be extremely valuable in exploring gender and 
generational trends within British Sikh activism.  A study by Nagel and Staeheli (2011) seeks 
to understand the role of religion amongst activists who identified as Muslim. They found 
that many of their respondents “were deeply concerned about the misrepresentation of Islam 
in the West.  Respondents  however, were far from unified in their views on religion as a 
basis for political action and mobilisation” (438). Similar trends can be identified amongst 
young millenial British Sikh activists. Events relating to the attack on the holiest of Sikh sites 
stirs up emotions amongst many of the young Sikhs I have spoken to, including those who 
were born after 1984. Sentiments very much express the opinion that Operation Bluestar was 
a direct attack on the Sikh community per se, under the pretence of the Indian Government to 
control terrorism as a result of the increasing popularity of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. 
Adversely however, Bhindranwale’s popularity amongst millennial Sikhs is ever increasing 
and he represents the injustice that is felt by millions of Sikhs across the world in the cover 
up of events leading to Operation Bluestar and the events which followed, in particular the 





It is clear that the British Sikh community has made the most of social space by taking 
to the streets in mass demonstrations to raise awareness of issues that matter to them. The 
Miri-Piri concept in Sikh teachings has its role to play in motivating the activist spirit 
amongst British Sikhs, and indeed, Sikhs worldwide. The increase in Sikh organisations, both 
in Britain and North America, for example, indicate that young Sikhs are taking the lead in 
finding new ways for engaging with political and human rights issues. A criticism of the Sikh 
Manifesto: 2015-2020 has been that it does not cover caste discrimination legislation amongst 
its ten points of action. It is well to note here that the Sikh Manifesto was based on extensive 
outreach with the British Sikh community in highlighting issues that mattered to THEM. The 
community itself does not believe that caste itself poses any issues within the community and 
is therefore not an area that needed to be addressed by the incoming Government.  . On the 
whole, the British Sikh community has generally opposed caste based legislation due to the 
factors mentioned earlier. On the other hand, the revelations in January 2014 of British 
involvement in the attacks on the Harmandir Sahib complex is an emotional issue amongst 
British Sikhs and one that has continued to occupy millennial British Sikh activism in 
contemporary society. Therefore, collective social memory around 1984 has shaped much of 
the activism within the Sikh community at a global level.  The millennial generation of Sikh 
activists have inherited the trauma of memory from older Sikhs and therefore, in this respect, 
strengthens the relationship between violent events and temporality (Nijhawan 2016: 27).   
So, in terms of caste prejudice, the experiences of the majority of non-Dalit Sikhs indicates 
that caste plays no role in British society amongst Sikhs and hence they largely oppose the 
implementation of the legislation. Operation Blue Star and the consequent Genocide of Sikhs 
in 1984, however, links the Panth emotively on an issue concerning the human rights of the 
victims and their families. Hence, there is overall support from the British Sikh community, 
especially the millennial generation, for a public inquiry into the full extent of the British 
Government’s involvement with the attacks. This issue is indeed one that affects the British 
Sikh community at large, across generations, as indicated by its inclusion in the Sikh 
Manifesto for 2015-2020.  
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1 Operation Bluestar refers to the Indian Government’s attack on the Harmandir Sahib complex in Amritsar on 
6 June 1984.  Harmandir Sahib, also known as the Golden Temple, is the most revered  Sikh religious site, 
constructed under the Guruship of the fifth Sikh Guru, Arjan.   The, then, Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, 
justified the attacks as necessary in order to control an increasing hostility towards the Indian Government as a 
result of the popularity of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale amongst the Sikhs. Indira Gandhi was assassinated 
by her two Sikh bodyguards on 31 October 1984.  The result was a bloody genocide of thousands of Sikhs in 
Delhi. Countless Sikh females were raped and thousands of males, both children and adults, were openly set 
fire to on the streets of Delhi. 
2 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85522/caste-
discrimination.pdf     
3 Available at http://www.britishsikhreport.org/british-sikh-report-download-2013 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
4 See the 2017 report commissioned by the Sikh Federation UK: Miller, Phil (2017)  Sacrificing Sikhs: The Need 
for an Investigation. Sikh Federation UK.  Available at http://www.sikhfeduk.com/assets/files/Sacrificing-Sikhs-
Report-2017.pdf  
5 See  Singh, Jasjit (2017) “The idea, context, framing and realities of ‘Sikh radicalisation’ in Britain: Full 
Report.” Crest.  Available at https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/  
6 Available at http://www.thesikhnetwork.com/the-manifesto/ 
7 Available at http://www.britishsikhreport.org/british-sikh-report-download-2015/ 
8 The UK Sikh Survey 2016 is the largest and most comprehensive of surveys undertaken to date on the British 
Sikh Community.  Its analysis, by the Sikh Network, is based on the 4,500 respones to its survey, and is 
available at http://www.thesikhnetwork.com/uk-sikh-survey-2016/  
9 Further details about the campaign can be accessed at http://www.1984yesitsgenocide.org/ 
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